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The federal budget landscape has changed
dramatically during the last six years. After a
steady decline in the deficit from 1993 to 1996,
a budget “surprise” unexpectedly brought the
budget close to balance in 1997 and moved it
into surplus in 1998 for the first time in twenty-
nine years. The deficit decline and the move
into surplus resulted from a combination of 
factors, including a surge in individual income
tax receipts, slower growth of medical costs,
lower interest rates, economic growth, and the
1990 and 1993 deficit-reduction laws.
These events, combined with legislation
adopted in 1997, have produced a new budget
outlook. If current policies are maintained, sur-
pluses are expected to continue for twenty
years, completely retiring the outstanding fed-
eral debt. However, deficits are expected to
reappear after 2020 due to rising Social Security
and medical spending. Of course, the magni-
tudes of the surpluses and subsequent deficits
are subject to substantial uncertainty.
After decades of struggling to reduce
deficits, policymakers now face the unfamiliar
issue of how to respond to surpluses. A variety
of proposals would reduce the projected sur-
pluses by cutting taxes or increasing federal
spending. President Clinton has proposed re-
ducing the projected surpluses by 32 percent
through spending increases for defense, edu-
cation, and other programs, and tax cuts to 
fund individual savings accounts. Congress has
adopted a budget resolution that envisions
reducing the projected surpluses by a similar
amount, primarily through tax cuts.
Reducing the surpluses would lower gov-
ernment saving and would require tax increases
or spending cuts in the future. Under plausible
assumptions, most of the proposed tax cuts and
spending increases would reduce national sav-
ing because private saving would not rise to
fully offset the decline in government saving. As
a result, the proposals would increase current
consumption but would reduce future output
and consumption. In particular, the proposals
are likely to increase consumption by current
generations and reduce consumption by future
generations. An evaluation of the desirability of
this shift depends on value judgments about the
needs, rights, and obligations of the different
generations.
Different considerations are relevant for
some proposed tax cuts and spending increases.
Proposals to reduce the tax burden on saving or
to create tax-funded individual savings accounts
might stimulate private saving, although the
increase would probably still not be sufficient to
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offset the decline in government saving.
Compared with preserving the projected sur-
pluses, individual accounts would have distinc-
tive implications for personal freedom, risk
allocation, administrative costs, and political via-
bility. Increases in government investments, such
as education and infrastructure, would be desir-
able if they corrected market failures in ways
that offered higher returns than private invest-
ment.
BACKGROUND
Although this article does not offer a
detailed description of historical budget policy,
it is useful to review a few major trends. Figure
1 indicates that the ratio of publicly held federal
debt to gross domestic product (GDP) declined
from fiscal 1962 to 1974,
1 except during reces-
sions, because deficits were sufficiently small
that the debt grew more slowly than GDP. As
shown in Figure 2, outlays rose sharply as a
share of GDP in 1966–68, but receipts also
increased due to the income surtax. The decline
of the debt-to-GDP ratio was halted in 1974, and
the ratio remained relatively stable until 1981.
Outlays rose during this period, but receipts
also increased as high inflation pushed taxpay-
ers into higher individual income tax brackets.
The ratio of debt to GDP nearly doubled from
1981 to 1993, an unprecedented rise during a
peacetime expansion. By 1993 the debt equaled
50 percent of annual GDP, the highest level
since 1956. Receipts declined as a share of GDP,
as a result of the 1981 across-the-board income-
tax-rate reduction, while outlays grew.
The debt-to-GDP ratio declined after 1993,
falling to 44 percent in 1998. Figure 2 reveals
that this decline was achieved by both increas-
ing receipts and reducing outlays, as shares of
GDP. In 1998, the ratio of receipts to GDP was
at its highest level since 1944, and the ratio of
outlays to GDP was at its lowest level since
1974.
The composition of outlays has also
changed dramatically. The budget laws divide
noninterest spending into two categories: dis-
cretionary and entitlement programs. Discretion-
ary programs may continue to operate only if
Congress and the president approve their fund-
ing through annual appropriation bills. Half of
all discretionary spending currently goes to
national defense, with the rest funding a wide
range of programs such as highways, law en-
forcement, and national parks. Entitlement pro-
grams do not require annual appropriations
because Congress and the president have per-
manently authorized them to pay benefits to eli-
gible individuals based on formulas set by law.
These programs may operate indefinitely,
unless Congress and the president change the
underlying laws. Three-quarters of entitlement
spending goes to Social Security, Medicare, and
the federal share of Medicaid. The other quarter
is devoted to a range of smaller programs, in-
cluding veterans’ benefits, unemployment com-
pensation, farm subsidies, and welfare.
As shown in Figure 3, defense spending,
nondefense discretionary spending, and entitle-
ment spending have followed sharply different
patterns (as shares of GDP) over the 1962–98
period. Defense spending followed a strong down-
ward trend, from 9.3 percent to 3.2 percent of
Figure 1
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GDP, interrupted in 1966–68 during the Viet-
nam conflict and during the 1980–86 defense
buildup; its 1998 share of GDP was the lowest
since 1940. Representing 3.4 percent of GDP,
nondefense discretionary spending generally
rose before 1981 and fell thereafter, with little
net change. As discussed below, recent deficit
reduction efforts have focused on cutting de-
fense and nondefense discretionary spending.
In contrast, entitlement spending has followed a
strong upward trend, from 4.9 percent to 10.2
percent of GDP.
2 As indicated in Figure 4, most
of this growth has been in Social Security,
Medicare, and the federal share of Medicaid.
RECENT BUDGET DEVELOPMENTS
Steady Deficit Decline, 1993–96
The unexpected move into surplus was
preceded by a steady reduction in the deficit
from 1993 to 1996. After peaking at $290 billion
in fiscal 1992, the deficit declined to $107 billion
in fiscal 1996.
A combination of economic events and
policy changes precipitated this deficit decline.
The continued economic expansion boosted
receipts, and lower nominal interest rates re-
duced the government’s interest expense. The
conclusion of the costly savings and loan bail-
out also reduced outlays. One important trend,
shown in Figure 5, was the slower growth of
medical costs, which restrained Medicare and
Medicaid spending. However, a major portion
of the decline was the result of policy changes
made by the 1990 and 1993 deficit-reduction
laws. These laws tightened Medicare reimburse-
ments to health care providers, increased
income and excise taxes, and locked in fiscal
discipline through the Budget Enforcement Act
(BEA).
The BEA, adopted for fiscal years 1991–95
by the 1990 law and extended to 1998 by the
1993 law, imposed two important restrictions on
budget policy. First, it capped nominal discre-
tionary spending at approximately $550 billion
throughout this period, reducing defense and
nondefense discretionary spending as shares of
GDP, as shown in Figure 3. Second, the BEA
imposed a pay-as-you-go rule that prohibited
changing the laws to reduce taxes without
reducing entitlement spending or to increase
entitlement spending without increasing taxes,
although it did not require any action to offset
Figure 3
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Figure 5
Slower Growth of Medical Costs
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the entitlement growth built into current law.
The discretionary cap and the pay-as-you-go
rule could be waived if Congress and the presi-
dent designated a measure as an emergency.
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Budget Surplus Surprise, 1997–98
The steady deficit decline from 1993 to
1996 was followed by a surprise that moved the
budget close to balance in 1997 and into surplus
in 1998. To appreciate the magnitude of this
budget surplus surprise, it is necessary to under-
stand what forecasters expected in 1996.
Although the deficit had declined for four
consecutive years, forecasters expected it to be-
gin rising again. Figure 6 charts budget projec-
tions for fiscal years 1997–99 made at various
dates by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).
(The projections assumed there would be no
changes in tax and entitlement laws and that
discretionary spending would equal the BEA
cap until it expired.) In May 1996, CBO pro-
jected deficits of about $200 billion for 1997–99.
Although there were no major relevant policy
changes, persistent good news repeatedly forced
CBO to alter its forecasts. Fiscal 1997 ended
with a deficit of only $22 billion and 1998 with
a surplus of $69 billion; CBO now projects a
$107 billion surplus in 1999. The magnitude of
these forecast deviations is unprecedented.
Analysts are still trying to fully explain the
budget surplus surprise, but several factors
emerge from a comparison of the actual fiscal
1998 budget outcome with the May 1996 CBO
projection (Table 1). One-third of the forecast
deviation was caused by an overestimate of 
outlays. Almost half of the outlay overestimate
was in Medicare and Medicaid, reflecting the
continued slower growth of medical costs.
Interest outlays also were lower than predicted,
reflecting both lower debt and lower nominal
interest rates.
Two-thirds of the deviation was caused by
an underestimate of receipts, primarily reflect-
ing an unexpected surge in individual income
tax receipts. Income tax receipts were boosted
by strong economic growth and by several other
factors, as discussed by CBO (1999b). Income
from partnerships and S corporations rose
sharply, and wages and salaries grew most
rapidly in the highest tax brackets. One impor-
tant factor was the rapid rise of net capital gains
realizations, as shown in Figure 7, which largely
reflected the recent stock market boom.
4 The
stock market’s continued strength suggests that
realizations remained high in 1998, boosting fis-
cal 1999 receipts.
Adjusting the Deficit For Inflation
The deficits and
surpluses reported in
this article are meas-
ured in nominal terms.
Although simple, these
nominal figures are in-
accurate during periods
of inflation. While the
nominal deficit meas-
ures the change in the
dollar value of govern-
ment debt during the
year, it is more mean-
ingful to measure the
change in the real value
of government debt. For
example, suppose the
government has $100
debt outstanding at the
beginning of the year,
with a 4-percent annual
interest rate. If the gov-
ernment collects $30 
of revenue and spends 
$33 ($29 for programs
and $4 for interest), the
nominal deficit during
the year is $3 and the
debt is $103 at the end of the year. However, if the inflation rate during the year is 2
percent, the debt at the end of the year has about the same real value as $101 of
debt at the beginning of the year.The real deficit is the increase in the real value of
the debt, which is about $1.
This real deficit can be obtained by correctly measuring the government’s real
interest expense. Although holders of the government debt receive 4-percent interest
payments, the real value of their principal (the government’s obligation) declines by 2
percent.The real return paid by the government to the bondholders is only 2 percent
and the real interest payment is only $2. Recalculating spending and the deficit with
this $2 interest expense yields the real deficit of $1.
Figure B.1 compares nominal deficits to real deficits for the 1962–98 period.
(The inflation rate is measured by the change in the personal consumption expendi-
tures implicit price deflator during the fiscal year, taking the deflator at the end of
each fiscal year to be the geometric mean of the values for the last quarter of the 
fiscal year and the following quarter.) Although the levels were different, the nominal
and real deficits generally followed similar patterns.The budget moved into real sur-
plus in fiscal 1997, one year before it moved into nominal surplus. Since the trends
are similar, I use the nominal figures, which are emphasized by policymakers,
throughout this article.
Figure B.1
Budget Trends Largely Unchanged 
by Inflation Correction
Percent of GDP
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THE NEW BUDGET OUTLOOK
The budget surplus surprise, combined
with new legislation adopted on August 5, 1997,
has profoundly altered the budget outlook. In
1996, CBO’s ten-year forecast projected large
and growing deficits. Now, the ten-year forecast
predicts large and growing surpluses, if current
policies are maintained. CBO’s longer term pro-
jections predict that surpluses will continue for
an additional decade after 2009 but that deficits
will reemerge after 2020.
As shown in Figure 8, CBO steadily altered
its forecasts for fiscal 2002 and 2006, as it did for
1997–99. (The projections assumed discretion-
ary spending would grow with inflation after
the BEA cap expired.) CBO now projects a $306
billion surplus for 2006 if current policies are
maintained, a stunning $709 billion change from
the $403 billion deficit projected in May 1996.
The predicted surplus grows to $381 billion in
2009, with the publicly held federal debt (which
is reduced by each year’s surplus
5) declining
from $3.77 trillion on September 30, 1997, to
$1.21 trillion on September 30, 2009.
Most of the revision in the 2006 forecast
reflects the continued effects of the budget 
surprise, but part of it reflects the August 1997
legislation. Unlike the 1998 forecast deviation,
most of the change takes the form of lower out-
lays rather than increased receipts (Table 2).
One-third of the improvement is attribut-
able to lower interest expense, primarily reflect-
ing the dramatically lower path of federal debt
(the September 30, 2006, debt is now projected
to be $2.53 trillion rather than the $6.75 trillion
projected in 1996). One-sixth of the improve-
ment is due to the 1997 legislation. This legisla-
tion extended the BEA (both the $550 billion
discretionary cap and the pay-as-you-go rule)
through 2002, tightened Medicare reimburse-
ments and increased beneficiary premiums, and
increased tobacco and airline taxes, although it
reduced income taxes for parents, investors, and
students. CBO (1997b) credits the legislation
with reducing the 2006 deficit by $118 billion:
$60 billion in savings from the discretionary cap
extension, $72 billion in Medicare savings, and
$20 billion in interest savings, offset by a $34
billion net revenue loss. Medicare and Medicaid
Table 1
Fiscal 1998 Receipts, Outlays, and Surplus
(Comparison of May 1996 CBO projection and actual outcome)
May 1996 Actual Forecast
projection outcome deviation*
Total receipts 1,544 1,722 179
Individual income tax 694 829 135
Social insurance taxes 553 572 19
Corporate income tax 172 189 17
Other receipts 125 133 8
– Total outlays 1,737 1,653 84
Social Security 383 376 7
Medicare and Medicaid 351 312 39
Interest 257 243 14
Other outlays 746 722 24
= Budget balance –194 69 263
* Forecast deviations that increase the surplus are listed as positive numbers.
NOTES: All numbers are billions of dollars. Details may not add to totals because of rounding.
Medicare spending is gross of beneficiary premiums.
SOURCE: CBO (1996, 1999b).
Figure 7
Capital Gains Realizations Surge 





















S&P 500 (right axis) Estimated
SOURCES: Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income;
author’s calculations.
Figure 8

















Date of CBO projection
Jan. 1999 Aug. 1998 Jan. 1998 Sept. 1997 Jan. 1997 May 1996
SOURCE: CBO (1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1998b, 1998c, 1999b).7 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  SECOND QUARTER 1999
spending has been revised downward and in-
come tax receipts have been revised upward
because CBO (1999b) assumes that part, but not
all, of the slower growth of medical costs and
the surge in individual income tax receipts will
continue.
As with any ten-year forecast, the projec-
tion of a $381 billion surplus in 2009 is subject
to substantial uncertainty. CBO (1999b) esti-
mates that a reduction of 0.1 percent in each
year’s real GDP growth throughout the next
decade would reduce the 2009 surplus by $40
billion, whereas a permanent increase of one
percentage point (100 basis points) in nominal
interest rates would reduce it by $20 billion.
Other sources of uncertainty include the growth
of medical costs and the level of individual
income tax receipts.
Although its detailed forecast extends only
through fiscal 2009, CBO (1999b) presents a
summary projection through 2060. (The projec-
tion assumes entitlement laws do not change
and discretionary spending and revenues rise
with GDP after 2009). According to this forecast,
surpluses will continue through 2020, and the
entire publicly held federal debt will be retired
around 2012.
However, entitlement spending is ex-
pected to rise sharply after 2010, first reducing
the surpluses and then moving the budget back
into deficit after 2020. The anticipated increase
in spending results from two long-term trends.
First, the dependency ratio (the ratio of the pop-
ulation aged 65 and over to those aged 20 to 64)
will rise as the baby boomers begin turning 65
in 2011 and as life spans are extended. Figure 9
plots the future dependency ratio from the
Social Security trustees’ intermediate projections.
Second, despite recent slow growth, medical costs
are expected to resume their rapid increase.
Figure 10 graphs predicted Social Security and
Medicare spending (gross of beneficiary premi-
ums) from the intermediate projections of the
Social Security and Medicare trustees. Federal
Medicaid spending (not shown) is also expected
to rise sharply.
Because of the rise in entitlement costs,
tax increases or spending cuts will be needed 
to restore long-term fiscal balance. CBO (1999b)
estimates that a permanent tax increase or
Table 2
Projected Fiscal 2006 Receipts, Outlays, and Surplus
(Comparison of May 1996 and January 1999 CBO projections)
May 1996 January 1999 Forecast
projection projection revision*
Total receipts 2,232 2,393 161
Individual income tax 1,051 1,138 87
Social insurance taxes 800 816 16
Corporate income tax 214 250 36
Other receipts 167 189 22
– Total outlays 2,636 2,086 550
Social Security 567 538 29
Medicare and Medicaid 706 537 169
Interest 385 140 245
Other outlays 978 871 107
= Budget balance –403 306 709
* Forecast revisions that increase the surplus are listed as positive numbers.
NOTES: All numbers are billions of dollars. Details may not add to totals because of rounding.
Medicare spending is gross of beneficiary premiums.
SOURCE: CBO (1996, 1999b).
Figure 9
Dependency Ratio Projected to Rise 
Sharply After 2010
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expectancy are difficult to predict over an ex-
tended horizon. Some analysts are particularly
skeptical of the projection by the Social Security
trustees and CBO that life expectancy at birth
will rise by only five years from now to 2075. As
discussed by Lee and Skinner (1999), time series
analysis of the mortality rate suggests that the
increase might be twice as great, which would
further increase Social Security and Medicare costs
and the size of the long-term fiscal imbalance.
PROPOSALS TO REDUCE 
THE PROJECTED SURPLUSES
As described by Stein (1998), the arrival of
the surpluses has left policymakers adrift. For the
last two decades, there was widespread agree-
ment in principle that the appropriate goal was
to balance the budget. After 1981, proposals for
large tax cuts or spending increases were con-
sistently rejected because they would impede
this goal. Some economists and policymakers
continue to oppose tax cuts and spending
increases, arguing that the projected surpluses
should be preserved. But others support tax
cuts or spending increases, which are now con-
sistent with budget balance, although these
measures would reduce the projected surpluses.
Because the BEA remains in effect through fis-
cal 2002, tax cuts or spending increases would
require altering the discretionary cap or pay-as-
you-go rule or invoking their emergency excep-
tions.
The projected surpluses are already lower
than they could have been, because of tax
reductions and spending increases adopted dur-
ing the last two years. The August 1997 legisla-
tion provided tax credits for children and higher
education costs, expanded the capital gains
preference and tax-deferred savings opportuni-
ties, and created a new Children’s Health Insur-
ance Program. June 1998 legislation modified
the BEA to permit $20 billion to $30 billion of
annual transportation spending outside the dis-
cretionary cap, and October 1998 legislation
invoked the BEA’s emergency exception to in-
crease defense and nondefense discretionary
spending by $17 billion in fiscal 1999 and $5 bil-
lion in fiscal 2000.
Many tax cuts and spending increases that
would reduce the projected surpluses have
been proposed. In his fiscal 2000 budget pro-
posal, President Clinton proposes spending
increases and tax cuts that would reduce by
about 32 percent the cumulative surpluses pro-
jected during the next ten years. His proposal
would reduce the surpluses by 24 percent
8
spending cut equal to 0.6 percent of GDP
would restore long-term balance, if it were
adopted immediately. The necessary tax in-
crease or spending cut will be larger if it is
delayed.
Of course, these long-term projections are
subject to even greater uncertainty than the ten-
year forecasts because economic growth, the
relative price of medical care, fertility, and life
Social Security and the Budget
Throughout this article, I use the unified-budget numbers that appear in CBO
and Office of Management and Budget reports rather than the “on-budget” numbers
that also appear in the reports.The on-budget numbers exclude the Social Security
trust fund, which was placed “off-budget” in 1985.
The payroll and self-employment taxes earmarked for Social Security (and
some income taxes paid on Social Security benefits) are credited to a separate trust
fund in the budget accounts. Social Security benefits and administrative costs are
charged against the fund. When Social Security taxes exceed Social Security spend-
ing (as in each of the last fourteen years), this excess reduces the amount the U.S.
Treasury borrows from the public and its future interest payments to the public.To
ensure that the budget accounts attribute these effects to the Social Security pro-
gram, the bonds the Treasury avoids selling to the public are “bought” by the trust
fund with its excess revenues. Each year, the Treasury “pays” interest on these
bonds to the trust fund, thereby crediting the trust fund with the interest that it avoids
paying to the public. In any year in which Social Security spending exceeds taxes
and the trust fund’s interest income, the trust fund finances its deficit by “selling”
bonds back to the Treasury.
In fiscal 1998, the trust fund was credited with $478 billion of income, consisting
of $416 billion in payroll and self-employment taxes, $9 billion in income tax on 
benefits, $7 billion in employer payroll tax “paid” by the federal government for its
own employees, and $46 billion in interest “paid” by the Treasury. Since Social
Security benefits and administrative costs were only $379 billion, the trust fund
posted a $99 billion surplus. On September 30, 1998, the trust fund held $730 billion
of bonds, indicating that if the past Social Security surpluses had not occurred the
Treasury would owe the public $4.45 trillion rather than $3.72 trillion.
The on-budget numbers for fiscal 1998 differed significantly from the unified-
budget numbers.The on-budget accounts recorded only $1,306 billion in receipts,
rather than $1,722 billion, because they ignored the $416 billion payroll and self-
employment taxes.They recorded only $1,046 billion of noninterest outlays, rather
than $1,409 billion, because they ignored $370 billion of Social Security spending
1
but included the $7 billion of employer payroll taxes “paid” to the trust fund. Finally,
they recorded $290 billion of interest expense rather than $244 billion because they
included the $46 billion in interest “paid” to the trust fund. With total outlays of $1,336
billion and receipts of $1,306 billion, the on-budget accounts recorded a $30 billion
deficit.This number differed from the $69 billion unified-budget surplus by $99 billion,
the amount of the trust fund surplus.
If current policies are maintained, the difference will rise over the next two
decades as the trust fund runs larger surpluses. For fiscal 2009, for example, CBO
(1999b, p. 33) projects an on-budget surplus of $164 billion, a trust fund surplus of
$217 billion, and a unified-budget surplus of $381 billion. However, the trust fund will
run deficits after 2020, causing the on-budget deficit to be smaller than the unified-
budget deficit.
Economists rarely use the on-budget numbers, which distort federal activity by
ignoring important components of receipts and outlays and treating an internal pay-
ment as an interest expense. For example, the 1998 on-budget numbers would not
have changed if Social Security payroll and self-employment taxes had been abol-
ished, even though the $416 billion revenue loss would have greatly weakened the
federal government’s financial position. Economists usually use the unified-budget
numbers, which include Social Security outlays and revenues and correctly measure
the government’s interest payment to the public.
2
1 The other $9 billion of Social Security spending was included in on-budget outlays to balance
the inclusion of the $9 billion income tax on benefits in on-budget receipts.
2 Although private firms’ accounting methods do not ignore pension operations in the way the 
on-budget accounts ignore Social Security, they also do not include pension obligations on a
cash basis in the way the unified accounts do. Instead, they record pension obligations as they
accrue. Analysis of this issue lies outside the scope of this article.9 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  SECOND QUARTER 1999
through spending increases for education,
national defense, and other programs and by
another 13 percent through tax cuts to fund
individual savings accounts, as described below.
However, it would increase the surpluses by 5
percent by raising tobacco and other taxes.
President Clinton proposes that most of the
spending increases and tax cuts be adopted only
after a Social Security reform plan is enacted.
6
On April 15, Congress adopted a fiscal
2000 budget resolution that envisions reducing
the projected surpluses by 27 percent, with a 35
percent reduction from unspecified tax cuts off-
set by an 8 percent increase from spending cuts.
Some members of Congress suggest reducing
individual income tax rates, while others call for
tax cuts for two-income married couples, reform
or abolition of the alternative minimum individ-
ual income tax, and further expansion of the
capital gains preference.
In view of the variation in these proposals,
no single analysis can accurately describe their
effects. To draw out the major implications, I
classify the proposals into three categories. First,
I consider transfer payments or tax cuts in
which the amount received by each individual
does not depend upon the amount he or she
saves. Second, I consider tax cuts that increase
the reward to saving, including tax cuts to fund
individual savings accounts. Third, I consider in-
creases in the government’s purchases of goods
or services.
Tax Cuts and Transfer Payments 
With No Reward for Saving
Surplus reductions through higher transfer
payments or lower taxes would place the fed-
eral debt on a higher path. The government
budget constraint would then require that taxes
be increased or spending be reduced in the
future to service the additional debt.
While it might seem that the tax cuts or
transfer payments would increase living stan-
dards today and that the necessary future tax
increases or spending cuts would reduce living
standards when they are implemented, the
effects actually depend upon how these policies
affect national saving. National saving, which
measures the portion of national income with-
held from current consumption and invested to
increase future consumption, equals the private
saving by individuals and businesses plus gov-
ernment saving. Surpluses constitute government
saving, and deficits constitute negative govern-
ment saving. Since reducing the surpluses
would reduce government saving, national sav-
ing would decline if private saving did not
change. However, if private saving rose by an
offsetting amount, national saving would be
unchanged.
Figure 11 displays the past behavior of net
private saving and net government (federal,
state, and local) saving, measured as percent-
ages of net national product. As government
saving declined during the 1962–92 period, pri-
vate saving also declined, causing a sharp drop
in national saving. As government saving
increased after 1992, private saving continued to
decline, leaving national saving essentially
unchanged.
One leading view of the relationship be-
tween private and government saving is the
Ricardian equivalence theory, which is the sub-
ject of an extensive literature survey by Elmen-
dorf and Mankiw (1998). According to this
theory, taxpayers realize the transfer payments
or tax cuts they receive today will require tax
increases or spending cuts in the future. To pre-
pare for this burden, they increase their private
saving by the full amount of the tax cut or 
transfer payment, leaving national saving un-
changed. The key assumption is that individuals
rationally plan their consumption based on their
expected lifetime income.
Under the Ricardian theory, the initial tax
cuts or transfer payments do not increase con-
sumption, because individuals save the money
they receive. Conversely, the future tax increases
or spending cuts do not reduce consumption
when they occur, because individuals draw
upon their additional savings. Reduction of the
surpluses through tax cuts or increased transfer
payments, therefore, has no profound economic
implications.
Figure 11
National Saving Rate Is Below 
Historical Levels
Percent of net national product
Net national saving
Net private saving
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However, as Elmendorf and Mankiw (1998)
note, a majority of economists reject the
Ricardian equivalence theory. Although direct
empirical tests have been inconclusive, these
economists reject the theory because they doubt
the plausibility of its assumptions. If these econ-
omists are correct, private saving would not rise
to fully offset the reduction of the surpluses,
and national saving would decline.
This reduction in national saving would
increase current consumption but would reduce
future national income and consumption.
National saving is invested in various forms of
capital in the United States, including corporate
and noncorporate business investment, owner-
occupied housing, consumer durables, and
human capital such as education or training,
and is also used to purchase foreign assets. A
reduced supply of saving would increase inter-
est rates and reduce these investments. With less
capital, future income and consumption would
be lower. Workers would suffer part of the loss,
because the reduction in the capital stock
would lower labor productivity and real wages.
The amount of future consumption that
would be lost depends on the real pretax rate of
return to investment. This return is uncertain
because it is affected by a variety of shocks to
the economy. Its expected value can be esti-
mated from the historical average of the ratio of
pretax real net-of-depreciation capital income to
the value of the capital stock.
7 The expected real
return is 6 percent to 7 percent per year, accord-
ing to estimates by Elmendorf and Mankiw
(1998), Bosworth (1997), Cooley and Prescott
(1995), Fullerton and Rogers (1993), and Sum-
mers (1990).
8 The relatively high return implies
that a reduction in national saving significantly
decreases future consumption. For example,
consuming one dollar more (saving one dollar
less) today would reduce consumption by four
dollars (adjusted for inflation) twenty-five years
in the future.
However, a reduction in national saving
might be desirable even if the amount of con-
sumption lost in the future was greater than the
amount gained in the present. The relevant
issue is how the changes in consumption at
each date affect human well-being. To examine
this issue, it is important to distinguish two ways
in which national saving might decline. First,
members of each generation might consume
more when they are young and less when they
are elderly. Second, current generations might
consume more throughout their lifetimes, and
future generations might consume less. Under
certain circumstances, tax cuts or transfer pay-
ments could reduce national saving in either
manner.
Tax cuts and transfer payments could
cause people to consume earlier in their life-
times if they are subject to incomplete informa-
tion or myopia. Individuals might not know
whether their tax cut or transfer payment was
financed by a reduction in the surplus that will
trigger future tax increases or spending cuts or
by an increase in someone else’s taxes. The
benefit of having this information might not 
justify the substantial costs of learning the rele-
vant economic concepts and reviewing pub-
lished budget materials. Surveys by Allers, de
Haan, and de Kam (1998) and Gruen (1991)
find widespread unawareness and misinforma-
tion about the level of and changes in govern-
ment debt. Alternatively, as Elmendorf and
Mankiw (1998) discuss, even if individuals
understood the future tax implications, they
might not fully use this information in formulat-
ing a rational lifetime consumption plan. The
complexity of intertemporal decision making
may lead them to rely on rules of thumb to plan
their consumption.
The assumption that individuals do not
allocate consumption over their lifetimes in a
perfectly rational, far-sighted manner is sup-
ported by empirical evidence. Campbell and
Mankiw (1991) find that consumption rises
when income rises, even when the income
increase was predictable in advance, which
contradicts the assumption that individuals pre-
pare for predictable income changes by adjust-
ing their consumption when they learn about
the increases. Campbell and Mankiw’s results
are consistent with approximately half of aggre-
gate consumption being done by individuals
who consume a constant fraction of their cur-
rent disposable income, without regard to their
future income. If these individuals receive tax
cuts and transfer payments in the present,
financed by tax increases and spending cuts in
the future, they will increase their current con-
sumption and reduce their future consumption.
Would this change in consumption pat-
terns be desirable? Since neither the original
consumption decisions nor the new ones are
optimal, no definitive general conclusion is pos-
sible.
9 Many individuals are likely to experience
significant tax increases or benefit reductions
when the federal government confronts the
post-2020 budget challenge. Individuals who
are unaware of this prospect or have not incor-
porated it into their saving behavior may be
consuming too much now and will be forced to
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inadequate saving. Tax cuts and transfer pay-
ments could further lower their well-being.
Conversely, individuals who overestimate the
stringency of future tax increases or spending
cuts
10 may be saving too much, needlessly sacri-
ficing current consumption to acquire excessive
future consumption. Tax cuts and transfer pay-
ments could increase their well-being.
One complication is that saving is taxed
by individual and corporate income taxes and
property taxes, which prevents savers from
earning the full 6 percent to 7 percent expected
annual real return that their saving generates.
The tax penalty on saving induces people to
consume earlier in their lives than they would
under a neutral tax system. If, for some reason,
the taxation of saving cannot be changed, then
tricking people into saving more would help
offset the distortion caused by the tax system.
This is an imperfect solution, however; it would
be preferable to directly eliminate the distortion
by reforming the tax system.
In any case, many economists believe that
the most important effects of tax cuts and trans-
fer payments are not changes in when each
generation consumes, but changes in how much
consumption is enjoyed by each generation.
They believe that tax cuts and transfer payments
would increase the consumption of earlier gen-
erations at the expense of later generations
because later generations would bear part of the
necessary future tax increases and spending
cuts.
11 Gokhale, Kotlikoff, and Sabelhaus (1996)
argue that the recent decline in national saving
was largely the result of fiscal policies that trans-
ferred resources from later generations to earlier
generations.
Under this assumption, the desirability of
tax cuts and transfer payments depends on value
judgments about the needs, rights, and obliga-
tions of different generations. Eisner (1998)
argues that there is little reason to increase
national saving because future generations will
be wealthier than current generations. How-
ever, Feldstein (1998) and Romer (1988) present
mathematical calculations suggesting the utility
gained by future generations would be greater
than the utility sacrificed by current generations,
because of the high rate of return from saving.
But Elmendorf and Mankiw (1998) point out
that such analyses are inconclusive because
they depend on the weights given to utility at
different levels of wealth. Furthermore, many
philosophers object to the utilitarian approach
underlying these analyses, stressing instead the
rights and obligations of different individuals
and generations. Some analysts contend these
rights and obligations cannot be determined in
any conclusive manner.
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Greenspan (1999), Passell (1998), Stein
(1998), and Steurle (1997) oppose reducing the
projected surpluses to any significant extent,
arguing that additional saving is desirable to
ease the burden current and future generations
will face from the post-2020 budget challenge.
Greenspan and Steurle emphasize the possibil-
ity that these burdens will be greater than ex-
pected if part of the projected surpluses does
not materialize because of slow economic
growth or other deviations from forecast
assumptions.
Tax Cuts That Reward Private Saving
Although a majority of economists believe
tax cuts and transfer payments generally reduce
national saving, this conclusion may not hold
for tax cuts that increase the reward for private
saving (or reduce the penalty the current tax
system imposes on saving). These proposals
would probably boost private saving, which
could offset the decline in government saving.
Many tax-cut proposals, such as reducing
income tax rates, would slightly increase the
after-tax return to saving. Other proposals
would do this to a greater extent. Some pro-
posals would reduce the surplus by replacing
the income tax with a consumption tax, setting
the consumption tax rate below the level that
would replace current revenues. Although a
revenue-losing switch to a consumption tax
could increase private saving by enough to
keep national saving unaffected, such an out-
come is unlikely. Engen and Gale (1996) survey
the potential effects on saving of switching to a
consumption tax and suggest caution in esti-
mating the magnitude of any increase. An
increase in national saving would be more
likely if such reforms were implemented on a
revenue-neutral basis.
A different approach is to give individuals
a tax cut, with the condition that they place the
funds in an individual retirement saving
account. In his fiscal 2000 budget, President
Clinton proposes that tax cuts of this type be
used to fund a system of Universal Savings
Accounts. Workers with incomes below $40,000
would be given $300 for their accounts and
would receive dollar-for-dollar government
matching for up to $700 of additional contribu-
tions, with smaller benefits for those with higher
incomes. An alternative proposal by Feldstein
and Samwick (1998) would give each worker an
amount equal to 2 percent of earnings subject 
to Social Security tax for his or her account.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 12
President Clinton’s proposed accounts would
not be integrated with the Social Security sys-
tem, but the Feldstein-Samwick proposal would
reduce Social Security benefits by seventy-five
cents for each dollar withdrawn from the
accounts during retirement.
Reducing the surpluses through tax cuts
that fund individual savings accounts would
probably reduce national saving to some extent.
Current workers would receive the tax cuts,
while future generations might bear part of the
future tax increases and spending cuts necessi-
tated by the reduction in the surpluses. Also,
acting on incomplete information, workers who
might not have reduced their saving to offset
government budget surpluses might reduce
their other saving to offset the highly visible
wealth in their accounts. However, the saving
reduction would be smaller under the Feldstein-
Samwick plan because lower future Social
Security benefits would offset up to 75 percent
of the wealth.
CBO (1998a) analyzes the relative merits
of private saving in individual accounts and
government saving through budget surpluses.
Individual accounts would offer greater per-
sonal freedom because individuals could make
their own portfolio choices. But not all individ-
uals will necessarily be prepared to make these
choices. In surveys cited by Levitt (1998) and
Diamond (1997), many Americans express un-
familiarity with the benefits of diversification,
the relationship of bond prices to interest rates,
and the differences between stocks and bonds.
To reduce the problems posed by limited
knowledge, individual portfolio choice would
probably be restricted to some extent, although
neither the president nor Feldstein and Samwick
specify the restrictions they would impose.
Supporters also argue that the introduction of
individual accounts would spur individuals to
learn more about portfolio choice.
Although the aggregate return on addi-
tional investment and its total uncertainty would
be the same whether the investment was
financed from savings in individual accounts or
from budget surpluses, the allocation of risk
would be different. With surpluses, the govern-
ment could diversify risk, particularly across
generations. With individual accounts, the ex-
tent of diversification would depend on work-
ers’ portfolio decisions. Budget surpluses might
pose greater political risk because the allocation
of the future tax reductions or spending in-
creases permitted by the surpluses would de-
pend on political decisions that could not be
predicted. Since individual accounts would be
private property, workers would have some
assurance they could retain the wealth in their
accounts regardless of political developments.
Unlike budget surpluses, individual accounts
would have significant administrative costs.
Mitchell (1998) and Diamond (1997) observe that
administrative costs consume 10 percent of
returns for many private saving vehicles. Costs
might be reduced to some extent if individuals
were limited to a few standardized portfolio
options.
Feldstein and Samwick (1998) also argue
that Congress and the president will inevitably
yield to temptation and reduce the surpluses by
adopting some form of tax cuts or spending
increases. They warn that rejecting individual
accounts and attempting to preserve the sur-
pluses would actually result in lower national
saving because Congress and the president
would eventually backslide and reduce the sur-
pluses through spending increases or tax cuts
that did not reward saving. However, it might be
possible to prevent this outcome by imposing
constitutional or other institutional restrictions
that preclude future backsliding.
Increases in Government Purchases
Another way to reduce the surpluses
would be to increase the government’s pur-
chases of goods and services. Many forms of
government purchases, such as Medicare spend-
ing, are essentially current consumption. In-
creases in government consumption raise issues
similar to those posed by transfer payments or
tax cuts that increase private consumption. The
choice between private and government con-
sumption should depend upon how effectively
each type of consumption satisfies the prefer-
ences of individuals.
Other forms of government purchases,
such as education, public infrastructure, and
health care for workers, can increase future out-
put. Public investment of this type is desirable if
it corrects market failure in a way that provides
a higher return than private investment. Of
course, these returns are often difficult to meas-
ure and may vary greatly across different types
of government purchases.
CONCLUSION
A combination of economic events and
policy changes reduced the federal budget
deficit for five years in a row and unexpectedly
moved the budget into surplus last year. If cur-
rent policies are maintained, surpluses are
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pletely retiring the outstanding federal debt,
although deficits are expected to return after
2020. Congress and President Clinton are con-
sidering proposals to reduce the projected sur-
pluses through tax cuts or spending increases.
Under plausible assumptions, many of the
proposed tax cuts and spending increases
would reduce national saving and lower future
output because they are likely to increase the
consumption of current generations and reduce
the consumption of future generations. Evalua-
tion of the desirability of this outcome requires
a value judgment about the needs, rights, and
obligations of the different generations. Differ-
ent considerations are relevant for some pro-
posed tax cuts and spending increases. Tax cuts
that reward saving or fund individual savings
accounts might increase private saving but
probably not enough to offset the reduction in
government saving. Increases in government
investments, such as education and infrastruc-
ture, would be desirable if they corrected mar-
ket failures in ways that offered higher returns
than private investment.
The decision on whether and how to
reduce the projected surpluses will have impor-
tant effects on the well-being of current and
future Americans.
NOTES
I am grateful to Justin Marion for research assistance
and to John V. Duca, Evan F. Koenig, Jason Saving,
Fiona Sigalla, Lori L. Taylor, and V. Brian Viard for many
helpful comments. I am solely responsible for any errors.
1 Fiscal years 1976 and earlier began on July 1 of the
preceding year, while fiscal years 1977 and later begin
on October 1 of the preceding year. The period July 1
to September 30, 1976, which was a transitional quar-
ter not included in any fiscal year, is not shown in the
figures.
2 The entitlement spending plotted in the figure is man-
datory spending (other than interest) minus offsetting
receipts. Collender (1999) provides more detail on
these budget categories.
3 Collender (1999) provides a thorough description of
the BEA.
4 The reduction in the top tax rate on long-term capital
gains from 28 percent to 20 percent, which took effect
on May 7, 1997, also probably increased 1997 realiza-
tions. Moreover, mutual funds, which generally realize
gains to a greater extent than do individual investors,
now own a larger portion of stocks. Barclay, Pearson,
and Weisbach (1998) document and analyze mutual
funds’ willingness to realize capital gains.
5 Although policymakers and journalists sometimes 
discuss “using” the surpluses to reduce the debt, this
terminology is somewhat misleading. Unless the gov-
ernment increases its cash balances or holdings of
financial assets, surpluses necessarily reduce the
debt. By the same token, deficits necessarily increase
the debt, unless the government reduces its cash bal-
ances or its holdings of financial assets.
6 The reductions in the surplus are calculated from CBO
(1999a, pp. xiii, 2, 3, 22). I treat the proposed stock
purchases and associated interest costs as not reduc-
ing the surplus.
7 As discussed by Summers (1990), this method is sub-
ject to several potential problems. Both capital income
and the capital stock may be mismeasured, particu-
larly because consumer durables, human capital, and
government capital are excluded. The average return
obtained by this method may differ from the marginal
return if the production function does not exhibit con-
stant returns to scale. Moreover, the private return
earned by capital may differ from the social return
because of monopoly power, externalities, and the
marginal cost of public services (such as police and
fire protection) provided to capital.
8 Some authors, such as Feldstein (1998), use values of
9 percent or more, based on the pretax return to cor-
porate capital. But, as CBO (1998a), Elmendorf and
Mankiw (1998, p. 23 n.9), Bosworth (1997, p. 163),
Diamond (1997, p. 21 n.24), and Summers (1990, 
p. 117) observe, corporate capital has higher pretax
returns than other investments because it is taxed
more heavily and because after-tax (risk-adjusted)
returns on different investments should be equal.
9 As Elmendorf and Mankiw (1998, pp. 50–52) discuss,
some individuals who wish to borrow to consume ear-
lier in their lifetimes may be unable to do so because
bankruptcy risk causes private lenders to restrict the
amount they will lend to these consumers. If it can, the
government should help individuals sidestep these
restrictions by borrowing on their behalf (giving them a
tax cut or transfer payment, financed by a future tax
increase). However, if the government’s ability to 
collect taxes is the same as private lenders’ ability to
collect loan repayments, then it cannot accomplish this
objective. For each dollar of additional government
borrowing, private lenders would reduce their loans by
one dollar.
10 In surveys cited by Burtless (1997, p. 400), 70 percent
of voters under age 50 state that they expect to
receive no Social Security benefits at all, suggesting
that many people have unfounded beliefs about the
magnitude of the necessary adjustments.
11 Even if future generations bear the tax increases or
spending cuts, Ricardian equivalence could still be
valid and national saving still might not decline. Cur-
rent generations might increase their private saving to
leave larger gifts and bequests to their heirs, compen-
sating them for the burden they will face. Elmendorf
and Mankiw (1998, pp. 45–50) survey the literature onFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 14
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Financed by Tax Credits (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, August).
——— (1998b), The Economic and Budget Outlook:
Fiscal Years 1999–2008 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, January).
——— (1998c), The Economic and Budget Outlook: 
An Update (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
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——— (1999a), An Analysis of the President’s Budgetary
Proposals for Fiscal Year 2000 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
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——— (1999b), The Economic and Budget Outlook:
Fiscal Years 2000–2009 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, January).
Cooley, Thomas F., and Edward C. Prescott (1995),
“Economic Growth and Business Cycles,” in Frontiers of
Business Cycle Research, ed. Thomas F. Cooley
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press), 1–38.
Diamond, Peter A. (1997), “Macroeconomic Aspects of
Social Security Reform,” Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity (2): 1–66.
Eisner, Robert (1998), “Must We Save for Our Grand-
children?” Wall Street Journal (June 3): A18.
Elmendorf, Douglas W., and N. Gregory Mankiw (1998),
“Government Debt,” National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper no. 6470 (Cambridge, Mass.:
March).
Engen, Eric M., and William G. Gale (1996), “The Effects
of Fundamental Tax Reform on Saving,” in Economic
Effects of Fundamental Tax Reform, ed. Henry J. Aaron
and William G. Gale (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press): 83–112.
Epstein, Richard A. (1992), “Justice Across the Genera-
tions,” in Justice Between Age Groups and Generations,
ed. Peter Laslett and James S. Fishkin (New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press), 84–106.
Feldstein, Martin (1998), “Introduction,” in Privatizing
Social Security, ed. Martin Feldstein (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press), 1–29.
this issue. However, empirical evidence suggests that
households do not systematically alter their gifts and
bequests to offset changes in their heirs’ circum-
stances (Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotlikoff 1996).
12 Legal scholar Richard Epstein (1992, p. 85) com-
ments, “I confess that my moral intuitions are not as
well developed…on this grand scale. Hard as I try I
cannot determine precisely what it is that my parents
owed me, or what their generation owed my genera-
tion or those yet to come. I am also somewhat over-
whelmed by a similar inability to speak about what I
owe my children, as distinguished from what I hope to
provide for them.” Kinsley (1994) expresses similar
views.
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